Wednesday, February 6, 2013

Breaking: WI Sup Ct upholds GPS tracking, dissent alleges 4th Amendment "trespass" occured

State v. Brereton has been released, today. A PDF of the decision can be found: here. I will have analysis up in a bit, but here is some pertinent text from the majority's holding:

First, we conclude that the seizure of Brereton's vehicle was supported by probable cause that the vehicle was, or contained, evidence of a crime, and was therefore permissible under the Fourth Amendment.  The seizure was supported by witnesses' reports that a car matching the make, model, and license plate number of that particular vehicle had been seen at the locations of recent burglaries in the area.  Additionally, after officers lawfully stopped Brereton and his co-defendant Brian Conaway in the suspect vehicle, they discovered that the vehicle identification number (VIN) did not match the license plate, and that the occupants of the vehicle were notably similar to the two men seen at multiple recent burglaries.  Accordingly, the three-hour seizure of Brereton's vehicle, whereby officers were able to install the GPS device, did not constitute an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, as applied to automobiles.  Moreover, in light of Brereton's Fourth Amendment interest in avoiding government usurpation of his property for the purpose of conducting surveillance on him, the officers' decision to obtain a warrant prior to conducting the GPS search was proper. 
¶3   We also conclude that the technology used in conducting the GPS search did not exceed the scope of the warrant allowing GPS tracking of Brereton's vehicle.  Judge Carlson issued the warrant based on the probable cause set forth through the facts recited in a detective's affidavit.  The affidavit and warrant's language contemplated the installation of a GPS device that would track the vehicle's movements.  That the device provided officers with real-time updates of those movements did not alter the kind of information to be obtained under the warrant, or the nature of the intrusion allowed.  Therefore, the officers' execution of the warrant was not unreasonable.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

Judge Abrahamson's dissent states, inter alia, that:

I conclude that in the present case, as in Jones, the State committed a common law trespass.  I further conclude that the trespass (seizure) was not reasonable under the circumstances of the present case.[28]  The majority explains that to determine the reasonableness of a seizure, a court must balance the public interest in investigating and thwarting crime against the private interests in maintaining dominion over one's possessions.  Majority op., ¶28.  Unfortunately, the majority does not conduct this balancing test.    
¶70  In applying the test of objective reasonableness to the seizure and its continuation, I conclude that under the circumstances of the present case, the State's dominion over the defendant's vehicle was prolonged beyond a reasonable time and was not reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which, according to the majority opinion, justified the initial and continuing seizure of the vehicle. 
... 
¶84  All told, this case needs far more careful discussion and analysis by the majority opinion of the State's invasion of the defendant's possessory and privacy interest in the vehicle and the defendant's privacy interest with respect to surveillance of the movements of the vehicle before a reader is persuaded that the State has overcome the presumption that the warrantless seizure of the vehicle is a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
 

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