The Wisconsin Supreme Court heard oral arguments today in State v. Purtell, 2012AP001307 - CR (Wis. Sup. Ct. 2014) (link to PDF of docket). A summary from the Wisconsin Public Defender's "On Point site" gives a good synopsis:
Purtell was on probation for animal cruelty convictions, and as a condition of probation was allowed access to computers only for school or work. After Purtell admitted having a laptop at home, his agent went to his home and removed the laptop. She found files showing females, some appearing to be very young, engaged in sexual acts with animals; after a warrant to search the computer was obtained based on that information, police found child pornography. The sole issue on appeal was whether the agent had reasonable suspicion to search Purtell’s computer for “contraband,” which the state argued included images of animal cruelty. The court of appeals held there was no reasonable suspicion, first because Purtell’s conditions of probation didn’t expressly prohibit him from possessing such images, and, second, because the state pointed to no reasonable grounds to believe there was some other kind of contraband on the laptop, but relied only on “generally suspicious” behavior.The oral argument can be found in Wisconsin Supreme Court oral argument archive, or click here for a directly link to the streaming wma file.
The Supreme Court's summary of the case can be found in its February oral argument preview. The State (Petitioner), frames the issue in this manner:
The content of Purtell’s computer, like the computer itself, was contraband regardless of whether Purtell’s probation included a rule or condition prohibiting the possession of images depicting cruelty to animals.Purtell (Respondent), frames it like this:
The Images Retrieved from Mr. Purtell’s Computer Were Inadmissible Because the Probation Agent Did Not Have Reasonable Grounds to Believe the Computer Contained Contraband.
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Courts must separately analyze the reasonableness of a search for a computer and a search of the contents of a computer.The State's Reply Brief can be found here.
The appellate court, which reversed and remanded the trial court, gives the following background synopsis:
Purtell was convicted of two counts of cruelty to animals, one resulting in the death of the animal, and he was placed on probation. One condition of Purtell’s probation was that he not own or possess a computer and that he could only use a computer “at his place of business or school.” The purpose of this prohibition may have been to limit Purtell’s access to certain types of images, but the conditions of his probation did not actually impose a limitation on the types of images or written materials Purtell could possess.
At a meeting with his probation agent, Purtell complained about the no-computer condition. Purtell told the agent that he had a working laptop and a desktop computer that did not work, both at his residence. Purtell also told the agent that he had a Myspace account and gave the agent his Myspace password.
For reasons that do not matter for purposes of this appeal, Purtell’s agent subsequently went to Purtell’s residence and removed his laptop and desktop computers. The seizure of Purtell’s computers is not challenged. Later, at her office, the agent looked at the contents of one of Purtell’s computers. The agent “clicked on files” and observed that titles of the files did not always match the images that were in the files. The agent located files showing females engaged in sexual acts with animals. The agent later testified: “[A] number of the files, when we opened them, had names of like very young females. [And there was] concern at some point that this was sex involving underage females.”
Based on information that Purtell’s agent gained from looking at the contents of Purtell’s computers, law enforcement subsequently obtained a warrant to search the computers. The resulting further search revealed a large volume of still images and “videos” depicting young children engaged in sex acts.
Purtell was charged with eight counts of possession of child pornography. He moved to suppress the evidence resulting from the search of his computers, arguing that his probation agent performed an illegal warrantless search. At a hearing on this suppression motion, Purtell’s probation agent testified that, prior to searching the contents of one of Purtell’s computers at her office, she looked at Purtell’s Myspace account. On that account, she saw pictures of “animals that were partially human,” such as a “woman that was half woman and half a cow.” The agent testified that, based on what she saw on Purtell’s Myspace account, she thought Purtell’s computers might have “files regarding cruelty to animals or death and mutilation of animals.” She was concerned about Purtell’s mental health issues.
After hearing testimony and viewing evidence, the circuit court denied Purtell’s suppression motion. The court concluded that the agent had “legitimate reasons of probation supervision to view the [contents of the] computers.” The court stated that the images the agent saw on Purtell’s Myspace account gave the agent reason to believe that there was contraband on Purtell’s computers.The substance of the appellate court's decision:
As Purtell makes clear, he does not challenge the search of his residence or the seizure of his computers. Rather, he challenges the search of the contents of his computers. Indeed, the State and Purtell agree that the issue here is whether Purtell’s probation agent had “reasonable grounds” to believe that Purtell’s computers contained “contraband.” The parties further agree that “contraband,” for purposes of this case, means any item that Purtell was not allowed to possess under the conditions of his supervision or any item whose possession is forbidden by law.
So far as we can tell, the State’s sole argument on appeal is that, based on several pieces of information, Purtell’s probation agent had reasonable grounds to believe that Purtell’s computers contained images depicting cruelty to animals or the mutilation of animals, and that such images were “contraband.” However, even if we were persuaded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Purtell’s computers contained images depicting cruelty to animals or the mutilation of animals, the State fails to demonstrate that such images are “contraband.”
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…before this court and the circuit court, the State simply pointed to behavior that was generally suspicious, such as the fact that Purtell possessed the computers at home in violation of the conditions of his probation and Purtell’s failure to attend a scheduled mental health treatment appointment. These and other factors may have justified the probation agent taking some action, but they do not supply “reasonable grounds” to believe that Purtell’s computers contained contraband. As we have explained, the State’s argument in this regard appears to be based on the faulty assumption that Purtell’s probation conditions prohibited him from possessing images depicting cruelty to animals or the mutilation of animals. Having rejected that assumption, the State’s arguments leave us with no basis to affirm the circuit court’s denial of Purtell’s suppression motion.
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